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Loney: County Court of New York, Westchester County: People v. Days

COUNTY COURT OF NEW YORK
WESTCHESTER COUNTY
People v. Days'
(decided December 31, 2009)
Three years subsequent to his conviction for a double
homicide, the defendant, Selwyn Days, moved to vacate the judgment
under Criminal Procedure Law section 440.10(1)(h) 2 due to his
defense counsel's failure to complete an adequate investigation of
possible alibi witnesses and proffer a plausible alibi defense to the
jury.3 The defendant alleged that he was divested of his right to the
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment4 to the
Federal Constitution, and article I, section 65 of the New York State
During the evidentiary hearing, the defendant
Constitution.6
proffered the testimony of several witnesses, all of whom failed to
put the defendant at the scene of the crime, and none of whom the
defense attorney chose to adequately investigate.7 According to the
court, failure to adequately investigate those parties and the facts
surrounding their testimony, deprived the defendant of a plausible

No. 0469/01, 2009 WL 5191433 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Dec. 31, 2009).
Id. at *1; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(h) (Consol. 2010) states in relevant part:
"At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon
motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon the ground that ... [t]he judgment was
obtained in violation of a right of the defendant under the constitution of this state or of the
United States."
Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *2.
4 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence [sic]."
5 Article I, section 6 of the New York Constitution states, in relevant part: "In any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against him or her."
6 Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *1.
' Id. at *2.
2
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alibi defense.8 As a result, the court held that the defendant was not
provided with the effective assistance of counsel as afforded by both
the Federal and New York State Constitutions.9 The judgment was
vacated accordingly and a new trial was ordered.'o
On November 21, 1996, the bodies of Archie Harris and Betty
Ramcharan were discovered in Harris's home in Eastchester."
8 Id. at *8.
9 Id. at *9.
10 Id. The defendant also made a section 440.10(1)(g) motion to vacate the judgment
which was denied because the "newly discovered DNA test results [were] of such character
as to create a probability that had such evidence been received at trial, the verdict would
have been more favorable to the defendant." Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *12. Section
440.10(1)(g) states in relevant part:
At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was
entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment upon
the ground that: . .. [niew evidence has been discovered since the entry
of a judgment based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which could not
have been produced by the defendant at the trial even with due diligence
on his part and which is of such character as to create a probability that
had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been
more favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based upon such
ground must be made with due diligence after the discovery of such
alleged new evidence[.]
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(l)(g) (Consol. 2010). Despite the power of DNA to
"convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent," the court reasoned that the DNA results
involved in the current case did not possess enough forensic value to exonerate the defendant
on the section 440.10(l)(g) claim. Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *11-12. The court opined
that, collectively, the defendant's alleged confession to the murder as well as his admissions
of his motive (which was to vindicate the sexual assault of his mother by the decedent,
Archie Harris) in conjunction with other corroborating statements made by the defendant,
was indicative of his guilt. Id. at * 12. Furthermore, the court asserted that a vacation of the
judgment under this statute was not due the defendant because the jury was fully aware that
there was no forensic evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Id. The court also denied
the defendant's motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the indictment based on his
contention that the newly discovered DNA and alibi evidence, whether reviewed collectively
or individually, proved his actual innocence required by Criminal Procedure Law section
440.10(l)(h). Id The court recognized that even though there was no express judicial
holding that suggested that a defendant can raise a "free-standing claim of actual innocence

. . . under

§ 440.10(1)(h)

. . . virtually all of the trial courts [that have] explicitly address[ed]

the issue have concluded that such a claim may be raised." Id. at * 13. "Nevertheless where
recognized, a defendant must, in order to establish actual innocence, demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that he is in fact actually innocent of the crimes of which he was
convicted." Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *13. The court acknowledged that although the
alibi witnesses were credible, their testimony was not devoid of inconsistencies. Id.
Moreover, as the court discussed previously, the DNA had limited value as to its effects on
actually changing the outcome of the case. Id. at * 14. Accordingly, the defendant's motion
was denied. Id.
" Id. at* 1.
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Harris was "beaten, bludgeoned and stabbed to death," and
Ramcharan "had been strangled and suffocated and her throat had
been slit."' 2 The alleged murder weapon, a bloody knife, was found
near Ramcharan's body. 13 On February 16, 2001, Days was arrested
for the murders. 14 On April 16, 2004, he was sentenced to two
consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life in prison-one
sentence for each count of second degree murder."
The court granted a hearing in response to the defendant's
August 2007 motion to vacate the judgment on his federal and state
constitutional claims. 16 At his hearing, the court heard the testimony
of Christopher Chan, the defendant's former trial attorney, and four
alibi witnesses.17 With the exception of Mr. Chan, the testimony of
the four alibi witnesses collectively asserted that the defendant was in
Goldsboro, North Carolina at the time the murders were committed."
McIver, a magistrate of twenty-two years, testified that she
saw the defendant and his mother, Stella Days, at her request, a day
prior to a warrant being issued for an incident which occurred earlier
that day.' 9 She also recalled seeing the defendant the day the warrant
was issued.20 McIver averred, pursuant to a criminal process update
generated from the clerk's office, that the incident occurred on
November 20, 1996, and that she issued the warrant on the following
day, November 21, 1996.21 On September 2, 2003, per the request of
Ms. Days, McIver allegedly forwarded a letter to Mr. Chan on a
blank piece of paper containing no letterhead informing him that
though she could not recall the month or date, the defendant was in
12

Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *1.

13 id.
14 id
15 Id.
16 id.

17 The witnesses were all residents of North Carolina, including:

Remona McIver,
Magistrate; Donald Evans, a restaurant owner; Cindy Artis, now known as Cindy Ramona
Dawson, the defendant's former girlfriend; and Perry Sharp, a retired captain of the
Goldsboro, North Carolina Police Department. Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *1. Donald
Evans, Kevin MacLaren, Sandra Thomas, Elaine Schwartz, and Robert Adamo also testified
at the hearing even though their testimonies were not discussed in the case. Id. at * 1.
18 See id. at *2 n. 1 (discussing that the murders occurred between November 19, 1996 and
November 21, 1996).
19 Id. at *2.
id.

20

21

Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *2.
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her office during the latter part of 1996.22 Initially, she testified that
she did not look at the clerk's records before she wrote the letter.2 3
However, she modified her testimony and later asserted that although
she did not print them out, she reviewed the records prior to writing
the letter to "refresh her memory." 24
In Chan's testimony, he indicated that he did not have a clear
However, during a
recollection of speaking to McIver.25
conversation with Investigator Grimes, which was surreptitiously
taped by Ms. Days, Chan asserted that he believed the September
letter to be a forgery as it was not on judicial stationary, was not
properly addressed, and was vague with respect to the date and time
the defendant was in her office.26 When Chan reviewed the letter at
the hearing, he again confirmed that the letter looked suspicious and
"was not self-authenticating," as it contained no "telephone number
and letterhead of any kind[; thus suggesting,] it could [have] be[en]
generated on almost any computer."2 7
Similar to McIver, Sharp also testified to encountering the
defendant in Goldsboro in November 1996 when he responded to a
dispute at the Days residence.2 8 Despite Perry Sharp's inability to
recollect the exact date the dispute occurred, or whether the
defendant was living in Goldsboro during the entire month of
November 1996, he was certain that the defendant answered the door
when he arrived at the residence, and that the incident occurred a few
days before Thanksgiving.29 Again, at the request of Ms. Days,
Sharp contacted Chan and allegedly spoke to him for one-half hour.30
Nevertheless, at trial, Chan could not recall the specifics of their
conversation. 3 '
The defendant and his former girlfriend, Dawson, began
dating in September 1996 and were dating for approximately one and
22

id.

23 id
24

id.

Id at *6.
Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *6. Investigator Grimes was a North Carolina investigator
that Stella Days hired in connection with the case. Id
25
26

27 Id
21 Id.

at *3.

29 id
30

31

Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *3.
Id at *6.
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one-half months. 32 Dawson confidently asserted that she spoke to the
defendant daily and that she " 'probably saw' the defendant everyday
while they were dating." 33 However, they saw less of each other
after a dispute between Dawson and Ms. Days, which occurred
sometime in November 1996.34 Even though Dawson testified to
seeing the defendant after the confrontation, the two were no longer
dating and communicated mostly by phone.3 ' Dawson was called
upon by Ms. Days to proffer a sworn affidavit stating that she lived at
the Days residence even though, according to Dawson, she did not. 36
Yet, despite Dawson's refusal to do so, she continued to maintain
during her testimony that she saw the defendant every day during the
month of November 1996.37
The last alibi witness, Evans, a restaurant owner in
Goldsboro, testified that during the month of November 1996, the
defendant ran a tab at his restaurant while Ms. Days was out of
town.3 8 He further alleged that he saw the defendant on a Friday in
November at the Days yard sale and the following Tuesday when the
defendant accompanied him to his house to deliver his purchases.3 9
Initially, prior to consulting his calendar, Evans said the date of
purchase was November 1st and the date of delivery was November
5th. 4 0 However, upon later review of his calendar, Evans modified
his testimony to assert that the purchase took place on November
15th and the delivery occurred on November 19th.4 1
At the request of Ms. Days, Evans contacted Chan twice and
supposedly spoke to him each time.42 Chan's alleged disinterest in
Evans's alibi caused Evans to forward an executed letter to Chan, that
he himself did not write, in which he alleged that he saw the
defendant daily during the month of November 1996.43 However,
32 Id. at *3.

33 id.
34 id.
35 Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *3.
36 Id. at *4.

3 Id.
38 Id

40 Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *4.
41 id
42 id
43

id
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subsequent to consulting his calendar, Evans realized that he was
travelling on the alleged dates of the yard sale and furniture delivery,
thus confirming that the letter and the dates were both inaccurate."
During Chan's testimony, Chan asserted that he had no recollection
of having any conversations with Evans.4 5
With the exception of the defendant's confession and alleged
additional admissions of guilt that he himself made, Chan argued, at
the first trial, that there was not enough evidence to meet the burden
of proof.4 6 Even though Chan attempted to assert that a third party
committed the murders, the jury rejected his theory.47 Accordingly,
the defendant's first trial resulted in a mistrial.4 8 At the second trial,
Chan predominantly argued a murder suicide theory which suggested
that Ramcharan killed Harris and then killed herself. 49 In addition to
this defense being looked upon unfavorably by the jury, an
unfavorable verdict-a conviction-was returned for the defendant.so
Chan's testimony revealed that as of March 2003, he was
aware of a possible alibi defense.s' Moreover, on March 24, 2003, he
forwarded correspondence to the prosecution regarding possible alibi
Yet, Chan did not employ the assistance of an
witnesses.52
investigator, thus resulting in none of the potential alibi witnesses
being interviewed. A financial dispute between Chan and Ms. Days
further prevented the interview of potential alibi witnesses.5 4
According to Chan, he did not drive down to North Carolina to
interview the alibi witnesses because Ms. Days refused to give him
gas money. 5 Following this incident, Chan petitioned the court on
two occasions to be removed as counsel.56 Despite his contention
that he would be incompetent to represent the defendant, the court

4
45
46

Id. at *4-5.
Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *6.
Id at *5.

47

id

48

id

49id

so Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *1.
s' Id at *6.
52

id

s3 Id
5 Id
" Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *6.
56

Id
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denied both of his applications."
During the evidentiary hearing, Chan maintained that an
argument of actual innocence was the defense that the case required,
hence why he adamantly argued that there was no forensic evidence
linking the defendant to the crime scene.5 8 According to Chan, the
decision to present an alibi witness was a "strategic decision," and
should that presentment be "effective, [it] had to be complete." 59
Moreover, as Chan was aware that the prosecution's argument was
premised on the fact that the defendant killed Harris to vindicate his
mother, due to Harris's alleged sexual assault of her, he precluded
Sharp's testimony in order to prevent Ms. Days from becoming a
focal part of the case.6 0
Prior to the court's analysis, as pursuant to New York State
jurisprudence, the court first recognized that both the Federal and
New York State Constitutions afford its citizens the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.6 ' According to federal jurisprudence,
as set forth in Strickland v. Washington,6 2 a "defendant must show
that [his] counsel's performance was deficient

. . .

[and] that the

Id. at *7. Based on the Westchester lab report tests, Chan knew that there was no
evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Id. at *5. In addition, reports from both the FBI
and Eastchester County revealed that the DNA which was found belonged to more than one
individual. Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *5. Yet, at the evidentiary hearing Chan could not
assert whether: (1) he possessed this knowledge prior to the first and second trial; or (2) if
he even looked at the reports containing this information. Id. The court opined that Chan's
inaction resulted in his failure to employ the services of a DNA expert to confirm or
disaffirm the DNA findings. Id. Ironically, he actually asserted that his defense strategy
would not have changed even if he would have been provided with an FBI report which
stated another person was present at the crime scene. Id According to Chan, it simply
would have been an additional argument. Id
5
Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *7. Chan asserted that he did not receive any reliable
information in support of an alibi defense. Id. Stella Days gave Chan taped testimony of six
alibi witnesses; none of which testified at this trial. Id. at *6. Mr. Chan did not introduce the
testimonies into evidence because he "heard Stella Days speaking in a stage whisper and
putting words into the witnesses' mouths." Id. The tape could not be produced at the
hearing because, despite Chan's assertion that he gave it to the appellate counsel, it could not
be located in their files. Id at n.2.
' Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *7. Sharp testified that Ms. Days was selling jewelry in
North Carolina. Id. Chan reasoned that the jury would use this to link the defendant to the
murder, as Ms. Days was not wealthy, and reportedly some items were missing from Harris'
residence. Id.
61 Id.
62

466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 63 Yet, New York
jurisprudence asserts that a defendant prevails on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim when he "demonstrate[s] that his attorney
failed to provide meaningful representation." 64 The court opined that
prejudice, albeit essential, is not a dispositive element by which the
New York courts, unlike the federal courts, determine whether an
attorney has provided effective assistance.6 5 Instead, it is only a
factor taken into consideration when determining whether the
defendant was afforded fairness of the legal process. 66
In keeping with precedent, the court acknowledged that as a
matter of trial strategy, a defense attorney should have, and does
have, the flexibility to employ certain defenses more steadfastly than
others, absent the scrutiny of the court. 67 Yet, despite the court's
acknowledgment of this, Chan's failure to proffer an alibi defense
was not considered an effective trial strategy.6 8 The court asserted,
pursuant to the reasoning of People v. Fogle,6 9 that Chan's failure to
adequately investigate the defendant's alibi witnesses was actually a
"fundamental . . . deprivation of [his right to] the effective assistance

of counsel." 70 Moreover, the court asserted that a "defendant's right
to representation

. . . entitle[s] him to have counsel conduct

appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if
matters of defense can be developed, and allow himself time for
reflection and preparation for trial."7 '
Although all of the witnesses were available to Chan prior to
the trial, with the exception of one, Chan did not adequately
investigate any of them. 72 Neither did he exercise any measures to
determine the authenticity of the magistrate's correspondence, the
origin of the jewelry, nor the validity of the purported alibi testimony
on the tape proffered by the defendant's mother.7 3 According to the
63

6
65

Id. at 687.
People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 219 (N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 222.

66 Id.
67 People

v. Bussey, 775 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2004).
Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *8.
69 762 N.Y.S.2d 104, 106 n.1 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2003).
70 Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at
*7.
71 Id. (quoting Bussey, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 366) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id at *8.
7 Id.
6'
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court, Chan's inaction to seek out potential alibi witnesses,
adequately review the DNA reports, and present evidence to the jury
about the third party DNA found on the murder weapon, served to
"highlight [his] incompetency at trial." 74 The court further opined
that Chan's incompetency caused him to proffer an implausible
defense to the jury which resulted in a prejudicial and unfavorable
Employing the
decision being rendered for the defendant.
7 6 the court not only determined that
reasoning of People v. Caban,
Chan's behavior was deficient, but that it extremely prejudiced the
defendant.77 Accordingly, the defendant's section 440.10(h) motion
was granted.
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
is a constitutional entitlement that ensures a defendant's right to a fair
and just trial. Powell v. Alabama7 was one of the first cases in
which the Court proclaimed that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel was a cherished and recognized right. 79 Nevertheless,
Strickland bore the standard by which a defense counsel's practices
must be measured and met in order to be deemed "ineffective."so
First, the Strickland standard requires the defendant to prove that his
counsel's deficient performance fell below the performance of a
Secondly, the defendant must
reasonably competent attorney.
prove that the deficiency in performance prejudiced him in such a
serious way that it divested him of a fair trial, thus resulting in the
defense counsel being the "but for" cause of the defendant's
unfavorable verdict.82

74 Id. at *8-9.

Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *9.
833 N.E.2d 213.
7
Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *9.
" 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Originally, the English common law did not provide counsel to a
79 Id. at 64-66.
defendant charged with a felony crime, except in very limited circumstances. Id. at 60. This
rule was strictly adhered to until 1836, when it was then abolished by an act of Parliament
which extended the aid of counsel to those accused of committing felonious crimes. Id.
Despite the adoption of much of the English common law by the thirteen colonies, they did
not adopt this particular rule. Id. at 61. Alternatively, the colonies codified a defendant's
right to counsel in their state constitutions, prior to the codification of the right in our Federal
Constitution. Powell, 287 U.S. at 61-65.
80 Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 694.
7

76
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"Judicial scrutiny of [a defense] counsel's performance must
be highly deferential." 83 If this were not the case, there would be an
overwhelming number of requests to overturn convictions on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.8 4 Omissions or actions by
counsel, which can be deemed thorough trial strategy will not be
scrutinized in a way that would result in the practice being considered
"ineffective assistance."8 5 "Moreover, when a [defendant] challenges
matters of trial strategy, such as the decision not to call a witness,
even greater deference is generally warranted . . . ."86
exemplification of this type of judicial deference was afforded to the
defense counsel in Ryan v. Rivera,8 7 where the court refuted the
defendant's contention that his attorney's failure to adequately
investigate and call his alibi witnesses to testify at trial divested him
of his Sixth Amendment rights.88
Contrary to Ryan's belief that the testimony of his two alibi
witnesses would exculpate him from his present vehicular assault
conviction, his trial attorney did not introduce the testimony. 89 Upon
the defense attorney's assessment of Ryan's statements, the police
reports obtained by discovery, and Ryan's request to ascertain
statements of his alibi witnesses, he determined that the alibi
witnesses were not credible and that their testimony would be
potentially detrimental to the defendant if proffered at trial. 90
Although the court did acknowledge that there were some
circumstances in which the failure to investigate and interview a
potential alibi witness may prove detrimental to a defendant's case, 91
it recognized that if a defendant gave counsel "reason to believe that
pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful,
counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be

8

Id. at 689.

Id at 690.
See, e.g., Rosario v. Ercole, 601 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2010).
86 Ryan v. Rivera, No. 00-2153, 2001 WL 1203391, at *1 (2d Cir. 2001). See also
United
States v. Luciano, 158 F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir. 1998), in which the court asserted that "an
appellate court on a cold record should not second-guess . . . decisions [of a defense
attorney] unless there is no strategic or tactical justification for the course taken."
8
85

8
88

2001 WL 1203391.
Id at *2.

Id. at *1-2.
9 Id. at *2.
9' See id (citing Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 220-22 (2d Cir. 2001).
89

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/15

10

Loney: County Court of New York, Westchester County: People v. Days

2011]

INEFFECTIVEASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

777

challenged as unreasonable." 92
A defense attorney is not automatically deemed to have
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel solely for his failure to
interview a possible alibi witness. 93 In order for the Strickland
standard to be satisfied, the testimony must have been able to either
exculpate the defendant or strengthen his case.9 4 The Sixth Circuit
held, in Avery v. Prelesnick,95 that the defense counsel's failure to
adequately investigate the defendant's alibi witnesses rendered his
assistance deficient and prejudicial to the defendant as there was a
reasonable probability that the alibi testimony would have exculpated
the defendant. 96
Defendant Avery provided his attorney with the name of
several alibi witnesses, one of which the attorney investigated.97
During the investigation, the attorney's investigator was alerted to
another alibi witness, whom he neither requested contact information
for nor tried to contact. 98 Neither the investigator nor the defense
attorney followed up with this alibi witness, a teenager at the time, as
they were allegedly depending on him to contact them. 99 The court
opined that the behavior evinced by counsel was not that of a
"seasoned attorney," and instead fell below the requisite standard of
reasonableness. 00 Moreover, such behavior was prejudicial to
Avery, as his conviction was mainly premised on the testimony of a
weak eyewitness.'0 o Consequently, the court held that the assistance
of counsel rendered was ineffective because the jury was devoid of
hearing testimony that may have actually supplied it with a
reasonable doubt. 0 2
A defense attorney does not have to present an alibi defense if
at the completion of an investigation he can determine that the alibi

92

9
94

Rivera, 2001 WL 1203391, at *2 (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at 691).
Id.
Bigelow v. Charles, No. 86 CV 1487, 1986 WL 15363, at *2 (E.D.N. Y. 1986).

9 548 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2008).
96 Id. at 437-39.
Id. at 437.
98 Id. at 438.
99 Id.
100 Avery, 548 F.3d at 438.
o' Id. at 439.
102 id
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witness may provide a weak defense at trial. 03 An attorney is not
obliged to present an alibi defense if it would result in a vigorous
cross-examination of the witnesses, which would in turn permit the
prosecution to proclaim the defendant's alibi as weak.'" A trial
strategy of this kind would only prove detrimental to the defendant.
Alternatively, " 'omissions [that] cannot be explained
convincingly as resulting from a sound trial strategy, but instead
ar[i]se from oversight, carelessness, ineptitude, or laziness,' may fall
beyond the constitutional minimum standard of effectiveness." 0 5 In
Rosario v. Ercole,106 the Second Circuit opined that the defendant's
counsel evinced these very characteristics when she failed to
investigate the defendant's alibi witnesses in Florida.'0 7 Defendant
Rosario, who was charged and convicted of second degree murder,
provided his attorney with a list of alibi witnesses who could
corroborate that he was in Florida during the time the murder
occurred.' 08 Even though the defense attorney's application to cover
the travel expense of the investigator was approved by the court, she
failed to relay this information to the investigator.'09 As a result, the
investigator assumed the application was never approved and the
The court adamantly
investigation was never completed." 0
proclaimed that the behavior she evinced was clearly deficient and,
moreover, prejudicial to the defendant thus satisfying the Strickland
standard."'
In contrast to the federal standard, the New York standard that
governs the ineffective assistance of counsel, as set forth in People v.
103 Brownridge v. Miller, No. 06-CV-6777 (RJD)(SMG), 2010 WL 2816265 (E.D.N.Y.
2010). See Matthews v. Mazzura, No. 04-0528, 2005 WL 195089, at *1-2 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that the exclusion of alibi testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel when the alibi witness was not able to give a full account of the defendant's
whereabouts on the day of the robbery in question); see also Allah v. Kelly, 32 F. Supp. 2d
592, 600 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that exclusion of alibi testimony did not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel when the alibi witness' testimony was not strong enough to
rebut the testimony of an eye witness).
'0 Brownridge, 2010 WL 2816265, at *14.
'os Rosario, 601 F.3d at 130 (quoting Wilson v. Mazzuca, 570 F.3d 490, 502 (2nd Cir.
2009)) (internal citations omitted).
106 601 F.3d
118.

107 Id at 130.

'08 Id. at 120.
'09 Id. at 130.

Id
.' Rosario, 601 F.3d at 131.
110
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Baldi,12 is more flexible. 1 13 The New York standard was developed
prior to the adoption of the Strickland standard and its use was
reaffirmed in People v. Benevento.114 The New York courts have
held that "so long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a
particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the
representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful
representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met."'"5
Furthermore, it is incumbent on the defendant to prove that his legal
representation lacked tact and strategy and thus resulted in an
unfavorable verdict.116
In New York, counsel has been deemed to be ineffective
when it was found that he "embarked on an inexplicably prejudicial
course."ll 7 Nevertheless, prejudice is not a dispositive factor as it
neither determines nor governs the outcome of the case."' Instead, it
is an essential factor, viewed amongst several factors, in determining
whether a defendant has actually received meaningful
representation." 9
According to People v. Sieber'20 and People v. McDonald,121
an attorney has rendered meaningful representation when he has:
"adequately prepared for trial"; "vigorously cross-examined
prosecution witnesses"; "made appropriate objections"; and "gave an
effective summation pointing out the weaknesses in the People's
case." 22 In McDonald, the court opined that the defendant failed to
show that his attorney's decision to forego the defendant's alibi
defense was neither strategic nor tactical.123 Furthermore, the court
asserted that defense counsel's decision to pursue a misidentification
claim, as opposed to an alibi defense, together with his performance
during trial constituted meaningful representation even though an
112

113

429 N.E.2d 400 (N.Y. 1981).
People v. Benevento, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (N.Y. 1998).

114 Id. at 589.
115 Id. at 587 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405).
116 -id.

1" People v. Zaborski, 452 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 (N.Y. 1983).
118 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 588.
119 Id.

People v. Sieber, 809 N.Y.S.2d 613 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006).
People v. McDonald, 681 N.Y.S.2d 112 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1998).
122See id at 114; see also Sieber, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 616.
123 McDonald, 681 N.Y.S.2d
at 113.
120
121
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unfavorable verdict was rendered on behalf of the defendant. 124
Notwithstanding the slightly different rules governing both
the federal and state standards, a similarity does exist in the deference
that is applied to an attorney's trial strategy. A "reasonable and
legitimate strategy under the circumstances" that may yield an
unsuccessful result does not mean that an attorney has provided
Furthermore, ineffective
ineffective assistance of counsel.125
assistance of counsel is not to be confused with "mere losing tactics
and according undue significance to retrospective analysis." 26
In New York jurisprudence, failure to provide an alibi defense
may constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel.12 7 Nevertheless,
the defendant must show that the defense was viable.128 Should the
defense attorney decide that the testimony of alibi witnesses is
"confused, contradictory, implausible and [can be] largely refuted," it
is within his discretion whether or not to present an alibi defense.129
In as much as an alibi witness may seem beneficial to the defendant,
an attorney is not obliged to raise an alibi defense that he believes to
be weak, suspicious, and has the propensity to be deemed noncredible on cross-examination by the prosecution.130 Nevertheless,
should counsel fail to employ a proper investigative strategy, which
results in the jury not hearing alibi testimony that could actually
exonerate the defendant of his claims, counsel is said to have
rendered ineffective assistance. 131 This is premised on the theory that
a defendant's right to counsel, additionally, mandates his attorney to
conduct appropriate investigations so that he may develop cogent and
coherent legal defenses to exonerate the defendant at trial.13 2
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution entitles all

124

id
125 Benevento, 697 N.E.2d at 587.

Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405.
See Sieber, 809 N.Y.S.2d at 615.
128 People v. Jean-Marie, No. 3931/02, 2006 WL 1159911, at *4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2006).
129 id.
1o People v. De La Cruz, No. 1311/89, 2006 WL 759682, at *14, *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2006).
131 See, e.g., Bussey, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 365-66 (holding that the defense counsel's meeting
with the defendant two days prior to trial, and his failure to investigate the seven alibi
witnesses he learned about during that meeting, was not effective trial strategy but an
ineffective assistance of counsel).
126

127

132 Id. at 366.
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persons to a fair trial. 133 Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment
contains many of the provisions that effectuate this entitlement-one
of them being the right for a defendant to have effective assistance of
counsel.134 "A fair trial is one in which evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution
of issues defined in advance of the proceeding." 3 ' The right to
counsel plays an instrumental part in our adversarial system. Absent
an attorney's knowledge and expertise, it is highly unlikely that a
defendant would receive the fair trial that he is entitled to by the
Constitution. Therefore, it is not only imperative that attorneys abide
by their duty to counsel and represent their clients effectively, it is
imperative that the courts effectively apply jurisprudence when trying
to determine whether this duty was met.
Early in its analysis, the court in Days qualified prejudice as
the dispositive element that distinguishes the federal standard from
that of New York. 136 Moreover, the court implied that should the
federal standard be satisfied, the New York standard is also
satisfied.137 As a result, the defendant was deemed to have met his
burden, as required by the New York standard, by virtue of
supposedly meeting his burden under the federal standard.138
Ironically, the defendant did not meet his burden under the federal
Despite Chan's failure to provide meaningful
standard.
representation, his failure to present an alibi defense was not the
reason the defendant was convicted of murder. Therefore, the court
erred in its analysis under the federal standard.
It is without doubt that Chan's deficient and derelict
performance did not constitute meaningful representation and thus
satisfied the New York standard regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel. Yet, this deficiency only successfully satisfied the first
prong of the federal standard. Strickland states that in order for the
mandatory requirement of prejudice to be satisfied, and the test to be
met in its entirety, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
134 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
'3 Strickland,466 U.S. at 685.
136 Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *7.
'n

Id. at *9.

138 Id.
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the result of the proceeding would have been different."l 39 Oddly,
the court seemed to dismiss the second part of the analysis when they
deemed the federal standard met.
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." 40 Chan's performance, or
lack thereof, though professionally unreasonable, did not prejudice
the defendant. The court acknowledged that "the defendant's
admissions to Cherilyn Mayhew [was] powerful evidence of the
defendant's guilt."' 4 1 The court further acknowledged that the
defendant's motive for killing the decedents-to avenge the sexual
assault of his mother which occurred just a few months before the
murders-was apparent.142 Lastly, the court acknowledged that
though the alibi witnesses were credible, their testimony did not go
without reproach.143 If all of these circumstances were actually
viewed in totality, there is no way the court could have realistically
deemed that the defendant was prejudiced, and thus met his burden
under the Strickland standard.
The federal standard requires the counsel to be the "but for"
cause of the defendant's unfavorable verdict, not the concurrent
cause.144 It is extremely unlikely that an alibi defense, consisting of
the four witnesses in question, would have refuted the defendant's
motive, actual location at the time of the murders, and his selfincriminating testimony. Therefore, Chan's failure to proffer an alibi
defense did not satisfy the requisite standard, as set forth by
Strickland, because it was not the "but for" cause of the defendant's
unfavorable verdict.
The testimony of the defendant's alibi witnesses lacked
transparency, consistency, and materiality. Yet, despite the court's
recognition of these truths, the court still deemed the alibi witnesses
credible-credibility that they were solely afforded based on their
socio-economic status. 14 5 At the onset of the proceedings, none of

' Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694.
140 Id.

141 Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *12.
142 id.
143

Id. at*13.

144 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
145 See Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *8 ("[Allibi witnesses . . . included otherwise
prominent citizens: a magistrate, police officer and local businessman.").
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the alibi witnesses provided specific dates or times of their interaction
with the defendant. 146 Instead, their testimony actually developed
throughout the duration of the case. Ironically, even if Chan would
have adequately investigated the witnesses and gathered all the
testimony which was ascertained at the evidentiary hearing, there is
still no guarantee that he would have proffered an alibi defense. If
the alibis could proffer inconsistent, immaterial, and opaque
testimony under oath, one may reasonably infer that they have a
higher propensity to do so absent the scrutiny of the court. Therefore,
even if Chan would have actually conducted adequate investigations
of these "prominent citizens,"l47 their weak testimony together with
the discretion that Chan is afforded by law could have, and more than
likely would have, resulted in him foregoing an alibi defense as a
matter of trial strategy. Federal and New York State jurisprudence
both afford Chan the discretionary right to forego an alibi defense
should he feel that the prosecution would vigorously cross-examine
the witnesses, and hence eradicate the alibi defense in its entirety. 4 8
That entitlement alone justifies Chan in foregoing an alibi defense,
especially since all of the alibi's testimonies, with the minor
exception of Sharp, were questionable.149
The court failed to recognize that whether Chan investigated
the alibis or not, his trial strategy would have more than likely
remained the same-no alibi defense. Even though his failure to
investigate the alibis divested Days of the meaningful representation
he is entitled to, this failure together with his decision to forego an
alibi defense did not prejudice him. The evidence did. As a result,
the court in Days erred in holding that Chan rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel to the defendant pursuant to the Strickland
standard.
The Strickland standard, in contrast to the New York
standard, is much stricter. And because of this strict standard, New
Id. at *13.
Id at *8.
148 See Brownridge, 2010 WL 2816265, at *14 (discussing that if the defense attorney can
ascertain from the investigation of the witnesses that they provide weak defenses that would
be not be beneficial to the defendant, they do not have to present an alibi defense).
149 See, e.g., Days, 2009 WL 5191433, at *2 (discussing that the Magistrate clarified her
testimony to assert that she did review the documents, even though she did not print them to
"refresh her memory"); see also id. at *5 (revealing that Evans' calendar keeping practices
have proven to be at "minimum, inconsistent").
146

147
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York courts should afford greater scrutiny to the facts and
circumstances of the case when applying it. Therefore, the same
veracity and attention that the Strickland standard requires, and that is
applied in the federal courts, should likewise be applied in the New
York state courts. Unfortunately, Westchester County Court failed to
do so.
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